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ARTISTS, ART COLLECTORS AND INCOME TAXt
ALAN

L.

FELD*

The federal income tax law treats artists and art collectors differently.
Similar transactions concerning artworks produce disparate income tax
results, depending on whether they involve the artist or the collector. On
balance, these results seem to favor the collector over the artist. But
notwithstanding the dismay of some artists and their advocates, the differences in result flow, in the main, from the differences in the source of
the taxpayer's investment in the work.
The collector'buys the work with after-tax income. Any gain is properly
treated as an investment return and is eligible for capital gain benefits.'
The collector, however, does not escape questions of tax characterization
entirely. Often his motive in acquiring the work reflects the happy congruence of personal gratification and investment opportunity. If' the
former dominates, the transaction loses its profit-seeking character and,
2
with it, the deductibility of losses and certain expenses.
In contrast, the artist acquires his work only partly with tangible investment, such as canvas and paint or clay; he adds his personal efforts
which often are the chief source of the work's value. The artist pays no
tax on this value he creates with his services until he realizes income in
some way, as by the sale of the work. The return to the artist is partly
personal services income and partly payment for holding the work after
completion, a kind of investment return we shall examine further. 3 In
addition, the artist's deduction of certain expenses and losses may depend
on his state of mind; like the collector, he may find it necessary to
4
distinguish his profit-seeking activities from his pleasurable ones.
This Article traces these income tax distinctions through a number of
common transactions, including sale of property at a gain, sale of property at a loss, expenses incurred to produce or preserve the property,
exchanges, and gifts to charity. In each case, the treatment of collectors
and artists is contrasted and the appropriateness of any differences is
considered. This Article limits the analysis to artworks embodied in the
form of unique tangible personal property, primarily painting and
sculpture; although some of the discussion bears on authors, book collectors, and others, this Article does not deal with the tax problems of their
transactions.
As we will see, most of the differences in treatment derive from the
t

@ Alan L. Feld, 1980. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Boston Tax

Forum, September 10, 1979.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., Columbia College, 1960;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1963.
See notes 10-22 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 72-86 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 23-34 and accompanying text infra.
4 See notes 87-104 and accompanying text infra.
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well-established tax differentiation between services income and gains on
the sale of property. A few instances, however, go beyond this justification. In Part V, I will propose two changes, one that enhances the tax
position of artists and one that limits the benefits currently available to
collectors.
I.

SALE OF ARTWORKS FOR GAIN

A person's taxable income generally includes gain realized on the sale
of property; i.e., any money and property the taxpayer receives, less his
5
investment in the property, enters into the computation of gross income.
Under certain conditions, however, the taxpayer may claim a capital gains
deduction in the amount of sixty percent of the gain. 6 Availability of the
capital gains deduction turns on whether the property sold was a capital
asset as that term has been defined and limited by the Code 7 and the
courts.'
The following section considers artworks as capital assets in the hands
of creators of art, collectors of art, and related parties. The taxpayer
generally seeks the favorable tax treatment that follows from capital asset
characterization.9 Under existing law, however, collectors often succeed in
this quest, while artists rarely do. This section examines the rationale
underlying this differing treatment, analyzes possible methods to improve
the artist's position in characterizing his artworks as capital assets, and
discusses further consequences for artists posed by ordinary income
characterization.
A.

The Collector

A work of art in the hands of a collector will usually meet the capital
asset definition without difficulty. The Code defines a capital asset as
"property held by the taxpayer"-words carrying few limitations' 0-and
then simply excludes six classes of property, notably inventory-type property and certain arts property, from capital asset status.' Within broad
limits, the definition distinguishes gain realized on the sale of property
held for investment from gain realized as personal services income or
from the normal operation of a trade or business. Collectors who sell
works of art ordinarily do not realize gain attributable to personal services; nor in the usual case do they engage in buying and selling on so
I.R.C. § 100i. All references herein to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise specified.
' I.R.C. § 1202. In limited cases, the alternative minimum tax, § 55, may offset part of this
benefit.
See I.R.C. § 1221.
8 See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
The taxpayer generally prefers capital asset treatment when there is gain, but prefers
noncapital asset treatment for losses in order to avoid the limitations on deductibility
provided by § 1211.
1' See I.R.C. § 1221; Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 923 (1962).
It I.R.C. §§ 1221(1)-(6).
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recurrent a basis as to warrant trade or business treatment. Their
artworks, therefore, are treated as investments and are properly accorded
capital asset status on sale or other disposition.
Conceivably, a collector who energetically trades his collection, frequently buying and selling, could find his property characterized for tax
purposes as held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business."12 In one case, Hollis v. United States, 3 the
taxpayer formed a joint venture to purchase Japanese objets d'art after
World War II. The venture was his first effort in such investment; it
began selling objects almost immediately after the taxpayer's return from
Japan, but without advertising or extensive sales effort. The court held
14
that the venture earned ordinary, not capital, income from its first sale.
The taxpayer's case for escaping the "primarily for sale" exception assuredly was not helped by his formation of a second joint venture shortly
thereafter to deal in Japanese art on a regular basis.
No other cases or rulings appear to have dealt directly with this question; the point at which a collector's activities transform him into a dealer
remains uncertain. 1 5 Presumably, criteria similar to those applied to determine when real estate transactions rise to the dignity of a trade or
business 16 might apply equally as well to artworks. 1 7 Cases involving taxpayers who buy and sell real estate bear significant resemblance to art sale
situations.' The much-vexed questions of what quantum of activity is
necessary to constitute a trade or business, at what point purchasers
12 I.R.C.

§ 1221(1).

13 121 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954). The case concerned the predecessor to § 1221(1),

§ 117(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, the language of which was identical. See also Estate of
Chndor v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 721 (1957), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 4.
'4 121 F. Supp. at 196.
" But cf Rev. Rul. 79-256, 1979-2 C.B.
105 (the Service reduced the amount of a
charitable contribution deduction for fine art prints under § 170(e)(1)(A) because the
contributed property fell under § 1221(1), notwithstanding that the taxpayer/collector had
not sold any prints).
"I For simple sales of artworks, real estate cases that involve subdivision of property would
be inappropriate as analogies, see Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir.
1969), because collectors ordinarily do not break up original works of art into smaller pieces.
Lithographs and other fine art reproductions might be closer in concept to subdivision of
real estate. See Rev. Rul. 79-256, 1979-35 I.R.B. 5.Also closer to a subdivider of real estate is
the purchaser of a collection of artworks who then sells off the unwanted works and keeps
the balance.
"7Anthoine, Deductionsfor CharitableContributionsof Appreciated Property-The Art World, 35
TAX L. REv. 239 (1980), opts instead, without much discussion, for application of the rules
for stock and securities. Id. at 270-73. This seems inappropriate, however, for artworks are
less fungible in nature. The special history of the stock and securities area, including the
reluctance of Congress in the depression years to allow ordinary losses, limits its usefulness
as an analogy. See Burnett v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 605 (1939), nonacq. 1940-1 C.B. 6,
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 118 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1941).
" See Turner v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); South Texas Properties
Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1003 (1951), acq. 1951-2 C.B. 4; Hamilton v. Commissioner,
33 T.C.M. (CCH) 463 (1974); Levin, Capital Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales, 37
B.U.L. REv. 165 (1957).
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become "customers," and what property is held "primarily" for sale would
have to be analyzed in this fresh factual context.' 9
In the typical case, nobody questions capital asset treatment. To obtain
the sixty percent capital gains deduction, the collector also must hold the
work for at least one year.20 If he obtained the artwork by gift, the
collector may benefit from the donor's holding period.2" Similarly, the heir
or beneficiary who takes a work on the death of another enjoys long-term
2
treatment no matter how short a time the two in fact held the work. 1
Unless there is some special impediment to capital asset treatment,
the collector usually can look forward to favorable tax treatment.
B.

The Artist
1.

Capital Gain or Ordinary Income

In 1950, Congress enacted section 1221(3) of the Code to exclude from
23
capital asset treatment artworks held by the artist who created them.
The Committee reports indicated discontent with the then-current tax
treatment of the amateur writer or artist as compared with that of the professional. 24 The latter, it said, receives ordinary income on the sale of a
work because he holds it primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business. The amateur, however, could avail himself
of the "loophole1 2' allowing capital gain on the "product of his personal
effort. '2 6 To close this loophole, Congress provided a statutory exception
to capital asset treatment for an artist's own work, whether professional or

amateur .27
Section 1221(3)(C) extends the no-capital-asset characterization of an
artist's work to others if they determine basis in the work in whole or in
part by reference to the artist's basis. In effect, the section generally
preserves ordinary income treatment until someone transfers the work

and the artist's basis is no longer relevant to the measurement of gain.
" As to amount of activity, compare Kelly v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960)
with Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955); as to customers, see Goldsmith
v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., concurring); as to "primarily
for sale," see Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (per curiam).
20 I.R.C. § 1222(3).
21 I.R.C. § 1223(2).
22 I.R.C. § 1223(11).
2 Revenue Act of 1950. Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210(a), 64 Stat. 906 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 1221(3)).
24 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 420-21; S.
REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3053, 3097.
25

Id,

26

Id.

27 The most notorious "amateur" case apparently was Dwight Eisenhower's sale of the

rights to his book Crusade in Europe at capital gains rates. See Eisenhower to Pay Tax as an
"Amateur Writer," N.Y. Times, June 2, 1948, at 31, col. 5. Another noted amateur was

Kathleen Winsor, author of Forever Amber. See Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384
(Ct. Cl. 1952). The effect of the 1950 change is discussed in Shine, Some Tax Probems of
TAx L. REv. 439 (1958).

Authors and Artists, 13
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This provision prevents artists from avoiding ordinary income treatment
28
by giving their work to family members or other related taxpayers.
Property passing from the artist on his death now escapes section 1221(3)
treatment; the basis of the inherited property to the recipient becomes the
work's fair market value, 9 as if the property had been sold, breaking the
bar to capital asset treatment. Section 1221(3) thus seeks to ensure ordinary asset treatment for transfers within the artist's lifetime.
This rule makes it unnecessary in the usual case to determine the
nature of an artist's income from the sale of his work. But for purposes
other than sale and in assessing whether section 1221(3) is overinclusive, it
is useful to analyze the elements of the artist's financial return. At least
three characterizations are possible. The work might be treated as the
embodiment of the artist's untaxed services, and gain realized on the sale
of the work would represent the equivalent of compensation for services.
Alternatively, the income might be viewed as gain from the sale of property having an inventory-like character, property the artist holds for sale
to customers as part of his business. In either of these cases, the gain
should be treated as ordinary income. But a third possibility exists: if the
work is not inventory, the artist can be characterized as holding it for
investment and any gain on the sale of the work should be taxed like
other investment gains-as capital gain and not ordinary income.
It may seem unusual to describe an artist as an investor in his own
works. Like anyone else, however, an artist may be an investor. When he
buys stocks and bonds, land, or the works of other artists, he treats them
as capital assets. No logical bar exists to his investing in the same way in
his own work. 30 A real estate dealer may hold some real estate for sale and
some for investment 3 l and a dealer in securities may hold some stock or
securities in the ordinary course of his trade or business and some for
investment. 32 The practical problem is to determine when this is so and
how to account for it.
The broad ordinary asset rule contained in section 1221(3) always
denies the artist investment income treatment. This result can be supported both logically and on grounds of administrative convenience. In28 This follows from § 1015, which determines the basis of appreciated property acquired
by gift by reference to the donor's basis. Thus, the donee's basis will be determined by
reference to the artist's basis and capital asset treatment is precluded by operation of
§ 1221(3)(C).
29 I.R.C. § 1014(a). If the estate elects alternate valuation pursuant to § 2032, the same
result follows. Under carry-over basis, now repealed, ordinary income characterization
would have descended to the next generation as a probably unintended consequence. I.R.C.
§ 1023 (repealed in pertinent part by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 299).
20 At least one case seems to confirm the artist's status as an investor in his own works. See
Estate of Chandor v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 721 (1957), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 4. The court
acknowledged that § 1221(3) usually prevents this kind of inquiry but was able to decide the
case, because of its specific facts, on the basis of the pre-§ 1221(3) statute.
31 See notes 16 & 18 supra.
32 See I.R.C. § 1236.
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come that the artist receives from the sale of his work immediately after
completion derives from the artist's services and the ordinary income
characterization resulting from section 1221(3) properly follows. In the
case of a sale some time after completion of the work, the artist's gain
derives both from services and from appreciation in the value of the
property during the "investment" period. Ordinary income treatment for
this latter component can be differentiated from a capital gain on investment of after-tax income. The income can be regarded as inventory-type
gain, which is specifically excluded from capital asset treatment; 33 or it can
be seen as return on an "investment" of untaxed services that have not
been augmented with significant after-tax expenditures. Moreover, ordinary income treatment can be defended on the grounds that it would be
too difficult to separate the portion of the sale price that was payment for
the original services performed in creating the artwork from the portion
that was a return on "investment."
Nonetheless, from the artist's perspective, the general correctness of
ordinary income treatment creates an unfair result when the artist sells his
work after he in fact assumes the position of an investor in it. To take an
extreme example, suppose the artist paints two similar abstracts, Alpha
and Beta, his only works. He sells Alpha to a coffector for $1,000 and
includes the proceeds in income. He keeps Beta with an eye towards
receiving a greater return through appreciation over time. Two years
later, the collector and the artist each sell for $50,000. The collector will
enjoy a $49,000 capital gain. The artist will include $50,000 as ordinary
income pursuant to section 1221(3), notwithstanding that $49,000 of the
proceeds represents a return that differs from that enjoyed by the collector on the sale of Alpha only in that the artist failed to include $1,000 of
services income on Beta two years earlier.
To place himself on an equal footing with other investors, the artist
could attempt to "cap" the ordinary services income element of value in
the work by paying his tax currently and converting himself into an
investor; any subsequent gain would be realized as capital gain. The
statute, however, contains no explicit mechanism through which he might
34

do this.

The artist apparently could use self-help to "cap" his ordinary income
under section 1221(3). If he transfers his work by sale to a family
member, for instance, the transfer would fall outside the ambit of section
1221(3)(C). Suppose the artist sells a work to his wife at its fair market
value. If the exchange is treated for tax purposes as a sale, her basis
would be her cost, 35 and would not be determined "in whole or part" by

reference to the artist's basis. Section 1221(3)(C) by its terms would not
33 See note II and accompanying text supra.
34 As an analogy, consider the similar position of the employee who receives, as compensation, property subject to a restriction. Section 83(b) now allows him to limit ordinary

income by electing current taxation.
35 I.R.C. § 1012.
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apply and, unless the wife's activities amounted to a trade or business, the
work would constitute a capital asset in her hands. Thus, if she sold the
work after a year, the sale should give rise to long-term capital gain or
loss.
The price of these future capital gain possibilities is that ordinary gain
is accelerated into income in the year of the interspousal sale. Worse yet,
if the spouse never sells the work, the artist will have paid tax on gain that
the family never realizes. Nevertheless, an artist may deem this an appropriate gamble in order to obtain capital asset treatment on subsequent
appreciation.3 6 The gamble may be especially worthwhile if his income is
low in the year of interspousal sale and the tax generated is modest.
The Service might challenge the interspousal sale as not bona fide,
arguing that the wife acted merely as an agent for the artist in this
transaction. 37 The government, however, will have difficulty maintaining
this argument because the Code treats husband and wife as separate
taxable entities except in specific instances where it explicitly denies such
treatment.38 The Service may also question whether her ownership can be
characterized as transitory or illusory and therefore disregarded-as
would presumably be the case if the wife sells the work to a third party
shortly after the interspousal sale, pursuant to an understanding. That
husband and wife file a joint return that reports their income together
3 9
does not by itself prevent their treatment as separate taxable entities.
To state the best case for the taxpayers, suppose their sale in other
respects resembles an arms length transaction between unrelated pal-ties.
Both husband and wife own assets independently. The sale is at a fair
price.4 0 The wife pays for the work from her own separate funds. Moreover, the artist places no restrictions on the future use of the work and
retains no proprietary interests. At this point, there is a substantial nontax
36 Capital asset treatment may be important in determining not only the character of gain

on sale, but also the amount of any deduction if the work is donated to charity. See text
accompanying notes 154-59 infra.
" Section 267(a)(1) disallows certain deductions of losses from transactions between related persons, including husband and wife. Section 267, however, by its terms does not apply
to gain transactions.
18 For attribution purposes, the Code often treats stock owned by a taxpayer as constructively owned by the taxpayer's spouse. See I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(1)(A), 544(a)(2), and 554(a)(2).
These results obtain, however, only where provided by express statutory rule. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 318(a)(l)(A) which applies only where "expressly made applicable."
" I.R.C. § 6013. Prior to 1948, the income tax generally treated single earner couples who
lived in community property states more favorably because the earned income of one spouse
could be divided and reported on separate returns. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
The joint return provisions enacted in 1948 in effect allow husband and wife in common law
states as well to split income. But joint return filing does not alter the independence of
husband and wife as taxpayers when that independence is not otherwise modified by law.

'0 The Service could not defeat the artist's plan by showing that the interspousal transfer
involved a small amount of gift in the hope of invoking the basis transfer rule of
§ 1221(3)(C). If the wife paid more than the husband's basis in the work, a part sale, part gift,

transfer would result and produce a basis of cost. Treas. Reg. § '1.1015-4(a), T.D. 7207,
1978-2 C.B. 106. Thus, basis still would not be determined in whole or part by reference to
the artist's basis.
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change in their respective financial positions in that she exchanges her
cash or property for his artwork. If the transaction meets these conditions, it accords with the rationale for the section 1221(3) rule and the
desired tax consequences should follow. The artist will pay tax on gain
derived from services and his wife will have capital gain (or loss) on an
investment of her after-tax dollars. On this analysis, sale at a fair price is
the critical element in preventing that element of gain in the work which
reflects the value of previously untaxed services from being taxed as
capital gain instead of ordinary income.
Although no case or ruling has dealt with the effect of this kind of sale
under section 1221(3), the principle upholding separate taxpayer treatment of spouses has recently been elaborated by two cases concerning
installment sales. Legislation now pending 4' would alter the specific results of these cases for installment sale purposes but would not fundamentally change the separate tax entity rule. In Nye v. United States,42 Dr. Mary
Jane Nye owned appreciated stock. Her husband, Charles, a lawyer,
needed ready cash to meet certain obligations. Both maintained substantial independent property. Mary Jane sold the stock to Charles at its fair
market value for cash and deferred payments. Shortly thereafter he sold
most of the stock in the market and used the proceeds to pay his outside
obligations. Mary Jane reported gain on the installment basis. Charles
reported a short term capital loss on the sale. The Nyes filed a joint
return. The net effect from the family's perspective was to realize cash on
the disposition of the stock, defer the gain on the appreciation under the
installment arrangement, and report a loss in the year of sale. If Mary
Jane and Charles were unrelated, each step would unquestionably have
been proper.
Even given their marital status, however, the District Court upheld the
transaction in all respects; it refused to treat Charles as Mary Jane's
agent. The court could not conclude that Mary Jane, rather than Charles,
had control of the proceeds or possessed the economic benefits of the sale
by Charles. "The simple fact of their marriage relationship, standing
alone ...[was] insufficient to deprive Mary Jane Nye of the benefits of
43
section 453(b)."
The Tax Court distinguished Nye in Wrenn v. Commissioner.44 Again,
both spouses had substantial separate net worth. He sold appreciated
I H.R. 6883, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REC. 5073 (1980). The bill, the Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980, was referred to the Senate Finance Committee on June 20, 1980.
42 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
1 Id. at 1350. The court quoted with approval from Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d
593 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the Fifth Circuit held that installment sale treatment was
appropriate for taxpayers who made installment sales of stock in their wholly-owned corporation to a trust for their children. The sales occurred after the corporation had adopted a
§ 337 liquidation plan but before distribution of assets took place. Nevertheless, the court
decided that the taxpayers were entitled to the benefits of the installment sales provision. Cf.
Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1973) (gain taxed on a § 337 liquidation to
donor of stock to charity because donor retained control over the liquidation).

-

67 T.C. 576 (1976).
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securities to her on a deferred payment basis. She agreed to sell them and
secure the obligations to him by investing the proceeds in an equivalent
amount of stock in a designated mutual fund. She redeemed enough of
the mutual fund stock each month to make the payments to him. The
effect of these transactions was to realize gain from the securities while at
the same time deferring the payment of tax on that gain. The court
disregarded the sale. It saw no independent purpose on her part for
making the purchase in view of her sale of the stock immediately thereafter and the prior agreement that tied up the proceeds. Her financial
position had not materially changed; the Tax Court held that in the
absence of a credible nontax motive, the sale between husband and
wife lacked substance.
Many an artist can arrange a sale to his wife that meets the Nye and
Wrenn criteria. If we view husband and wife as separate financial entities,
she will have exchanged a fixed sum for an investment position in the
artwork, a significant change in her financial position. Moreover, purchases of artworks often involve subjective motives; she may be able to
show that she wanted this particular work for personal or aesthetic reasons and thus provide a further nontax motive for the transaction. As
long as the work is not sold immediately after the purchase, all of these
will constitute nontax motives sufficient to meet the Wrenn court's stated
objections.
Assuming that an interspousal sale would successfully avoid section
1221(3)(C), limitations inhere in such an approach. For example, a multiplicity of such sales might not pass judicial scrutiny. Or a large number
of sales might evidence a brokerage or agency relationship instead of
purchase and sale. In addition, the spouse might independently fall under
45
section 1221(1) if she frequently resells the purchased artworks.
Thus, the interspousal sale to "cap" the ordinary income element in an
artist's work cannot be used too frequently by any given artist. Further, it
depends upon the fortuity of a spouse, family member, or other related
entity with independent means. Moreover, although the favorable tax
effects follow analytically, they have not been squarely sanctioned by
precedent. Finally, it has the shabby air of a gimmick. If the artist's cap on
ordinary income is appropriate, as I think it is, the Code should provide
46
for it more forthrightly. I discuss such a proposal in Part V below.
2.

Earned Income or Unearned Income

(a) In General
The artist occasionally finds that he can obtain a more advantageous tax
result if his sales do not produce capital gain, but rather are treated as
ordinary earned income derived from personal services. For qualified
4 See Rev. Rul. 79-256, 1979-2 C.B. 105.
46 See text accompanying notes 160-68 infra.
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pension plan purposes, 47 including individual retirement accounts, 48 gain
on the sale or other disposition of property by the artist whose personal
efforts created that property count toward retirement benefits as long as
the gain is not taxed as capital gain. 49 Section 1348, which provides, in
general, a maximum tax rate of fifty percent for personal services income,
incorporates the qualified plan definition of earned income 5 0° so that the
artist's ordinary income will benefit from this fifty percent limitation.
(b)

Foreign Transactions

Section 911 of the Code provides an exclusion from United States
taxable income for income earned abroad. Until recently, the Service took
the position that income to artists from their work in foreign countries did
not come within this provision because it was income derived from the
sale of property rather than compensation for personal services.
The question of the correct characterization of foreign income to artists
was squarely addressed in Tobey v. Commissioner. 1 The taxpayer-artist
maintained a domicile in Seattle, Washington, but resided in Switzerland,
where he did his painting and work in other media. For the years at
issue-1965 and 1966-section 911 excluded from the gross income of a
U.S. citizen, resident abroad for an entire taxable year, up to $25,000 of
"earned income" from sources outside the United States. Section 911(b)
defined earned income to mean wages, salaries, professional fees, or other
"compensation for personal services actually rendered"; where capital was
a material income-producing factor, the statute required allocation between services and return to capital. Tobey excluded $25,000 of gross
income on the sale of work created in Europe. The parties stipulated that
capital was not a material income-producing factor. The issue in the case
thus narrowed to whether an artist's gain from the sale of his work
constituted personal services income or gain from the sale of property.
The government argued that the form of realization-a sale of
property-determined its character. This position reflected earlier published rulings. In GCM 236,52 a 1927 ruling, the government had drawn a
distinction regarding the character of different amounts of income received by a writer. When he agreed to write articles for a stipulated
amount of cash, the proceeds received constituted earned income. However, when he transferred property rights in a literary work for a royalty
interest, the proceeds constituted gain from the sale of property. 53 In
1971, the Service restated this position 54 and extended the reasoning to
See I.R.C. § 401.
1.R.C. § 408.
4 I.R.C. § 401(c)(2)(C).
50 I.R.C. § 1348(b)(1)(A).
51 60 T.C. 227 (1973), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1. See also Rev. Rul. 79-85, 1979-1 C.B. 246.
" VI-2 C.B. 27, superseded by Rev. Rul. 71-315, 1971-2 C.B. 271.
13 Id. at 27.
54 Rev. Rul. 71-315, 1971-2 C.B. 271.
"
48
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an assignment of copyright to a musical work by a composer and to a sale
of artworks by an artist. 55 The Service maintained consistently with these
rulings that Tobey's income constituted gain from the sale of property.
The Tax Court, however, rejected this formal distinction between a sale
of services and a sale of the property rights in which the services are
embodied. It concluded that the relevant concern in section 911 is to
6
distinguish personal services income from income derived from capital.'
For this purpose, it said, the artist should be viewed as a taxpayer who
deals in services rather than as an entrepreneur who makes a product.
The court drew support from the qualified plan provision of the Code
that treats gains of an artist from the sale of his work as earned income;
this legislation had overturned the prior administrative position of the
Service. 57 Tobey's income therefore qualified for the section 911 exclusion. After an almost six-year pause, the Service acquiesced in Tobey and
revoked the earlier inconsistent rulings concerning musical copyright and
58
art works.
The Tobey reasoning has been applied with equal force to the source
rules under sections 861-863. The source rules determine when income is
derived from sources within the United States and have numerous applications with regard to the taxation of international transactions. Under
these rules, the source of gain from the sale of personal property is the
place where right, title, and interest in the property passes,5 9 whereas the
source of services income generally is the place where the services are
performed.6 0 In Cook v. United States,6 1 the Court of Claims applied Tobey's
characterization of the artist's gain as services income and held the source
of a sculptor's income was determined by the place where he performed
services. Cook declined to decide whether capital was a material incomeproducing factor-the question Tobey left open. If it were, an allocation
between services and return to capital would be required for section 911
purposes. For a sculptor, the costs of raw materials and processing can be
substantial; at some point capital becomes "material." Moreover, the reasoning of Cook could extend to fine crafts work, where the capital compo62
nent may be even greater. This question undoubtedly will arise again.
" Rev. Rul. 71-182, 1971-1 C.B. 214 (composer); Rev. Rul. 71-183, 1971-1 C.B. 215
(painter or drawer). The Service relied on Oppenheim v. Commissioner, 31 B.TA. 563
(1934) (royalties paid to author not compensation for services). See also Kluckohn v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 892 (1952), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 5 (sale of property rights in article not
earned income).
16 Tobey, 60 T.C. at 230.
" In Rev. Rul. 55-636, 1955-2 C.B. 17, the Service had held that such gain was derived
from the sale of property, not personal services.
56 Rev. Rul. 79-85, 1979-1 C.B. 246, revoking Rev. Ruls. 71-182 and 71-183. Curiously,
Rev. Rul. 79-85 says nothing about Rev. Rul. 71-315, see note 54 supra, concerning authors.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7 (1957).
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4, T.D. 7378, 1975-2 C.B. 272.
61 599 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
62 Cf. Holland v. Commissioner, No. 79-1090 (4th Cir. May 29, 1980) (where capital, in
the form of depreciable property, was determined a material income-producing factor,
"earned income" was limited to 30% of profits).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:625

The Foreign Earned Income Act of 197863 revised the treatment of
income earned abroad, primarily by replacing the fixed dollar exclusion
under section 911 with a series of deductions reflecting cost-of-living
differentials, housing expenses, and other special living conditions.6 4 But
the issues passed on in Tobey and Cook remain important for the American artist living abroad 6 5 because the deduction may not exceed earned
66
income from sources outside the United States.
The United States tax characterization of the artist's gain as personal
services income rather than gain on the sale of property may conflict with
the treatment of the same gain by other countries. Suppose, for example,
that a U.S. artist who creates his work in the United States sells it in
France under circumstances that permit the French government, under
its law, to tax the gain on the sale. Under Code section 901, the artist
ordinarily might claim a credit against U.S. tax for the applicable French
tax. But section 904 limits the credit by the ratio of the artist's taxable
income outside the United States to his entire taxable income. 67 Under
the Tobey-Cook line of cases, the source of the artist's income is the United
States. As a result, the artist has no taxable income outside the United
States, the limiting fraction is zero and there would be no credit; thus the
gain would be taxed twice, once in the United States and once in France.
The United States-France treaty contains language, common to other U.S.
tax treaties, that allows a victim of international double taxation to consult
with the "competent authorities" in cases of double taxation arising out of
inconsistent characterization. 8 But such remedies may be ineffective.
As this example suggests, the artist sometimes may find the blessings of
Tobey and Cook dubious. He might wish to elect in such circumstances to
treat his gain as derived from the sale of property and not as personal
services, with alternative source rules applicable. In Part V, I propose
69
such an election.
II.

DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES AND LoSSEs RELATED TO THE PROPERTY

The Code generally limits deductions for expenses or losses to those
incurred in a trade or business or in other profit-seeking activities. 70
Personal losses and expenses are not deductible. 7 1 People paint or buy
Pub. L. No. 95-615, §§ 201-203, 92 Stat. 3097 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
64 I.R.C. §§ 911-913.
6' The parallel problem of the nonresident alien artist selling into the United States is
discussed in Beghe, The Artist, The Art Market and the Income Tax, 29 TAx L. REv. 491, 500
n.44 (1974).
63

66 I.R.C. § 911(c).

67 I.R.C. § 904(a).
6 See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967,
United States-French Republic, art. 25, 19 U.S.T. 5281, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
61 See text accompanying notes 160-68 infra.
70 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 165(c)(l)-(2), 167, and 212. Certain specified expenses and losses
may be deducted without any profit-seeking nexus. These include interest, § 163; certain
taxes, § 164; casualty losses, § 165(c)(3); and charitable contributions, § 170.
71 I.R.C. § 262; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106.
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paintings for a variety of motives, sometimes recreational and sometimes
in pursuit of profit. Deductibility of art-related expenses will often depend on which motive predominates. This section examines the application of these concepts to collectors of art and artists.

A.

The Collector

Most collectors hardly can or wish to contend that they are in the trade
or business of buying and selling artworks' 72 They therefore cannot ben-

efit from those provisions of the Code that condition deductibility on
engaging in a trade or business, such as sections 162 and 165(c)(1).
Section 212, however, permits a deduction in the absence of a trade or
business for the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the production or collection of income and for the "management, conservation, or
maintenance" of property held for the production of income. To obtain
the deduction, the collector must manifest profit-seeking motivation. 73 As
the regulations make clear, "income" for -the purpose of section 212
includes gains from disposition of appreciated property, as well as from
74
recurrent returns.
Wrightsman v. United States75 involved deductions claimed under section
212 for maintenance and restoration of artworks, and for subscriptions
and travel. Mr. and Mrs. Wrightsman began buying art as a hobby, but in
1951, when they received one million dollars as part of a corporate
liquidation, they turned to the art market rather than stocks as a hedge
against inflation. By the end of 1960 they had purchased $5.2 million
worth of art that appreciated substantially while in their possession.
The Wrightsmans specialized in 18th century French art. They pursued
a course of self-education: reading, visiting exhibits, restoring and conserving their own art objects. Both became recognized as experts in their
specialty. They kept almost all of the artworks either in their Palm Beach,
Florida home or in their New York City apartment. Record-keeping was
done in an extremely detailed, business-like fashion. The catalog of their
works filled 26 volumes. The Wrightsmans installed air conditioning and
humidity control systems similar to those in the Metropolitan Museum of
Art to preserve the artworks. Based on the serious and business-like
treatment of their artworks, the Wrightsmans contended that profit72 In Judge v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1264 (1976), the court disallowed the
taxpayer's claimed depreciation deduction on decorative paintings used to furnish his office,
for failure to show a reasonable useful life. See also Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79.
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c) (1960). Section 183, promulgated in 1969, makes the profitseeking requirement explicit, but adds little, except a statutory presumption, to the prior
formulation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972). The regulations also list several factors
taken into account in making this determination, Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
14 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.212-1(b) (1960) and 1.183-2(b)(4) (1972). See text acompanying notes
85-86 infra.
71 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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making was their pri.mary objective and that their expenses properly were
deducted under section 212. The Court of Claims disagreed.76
Most of the scant authority on which the parties relied in the Court of
Claims arose not under section 212 or its predecessors but under the
similar standard of section 165(c)(2) and its pre-1954 Code antecedents
that allows a deduction to an individual for a loss arising out of a transaction entered into for profit. In Hamilton v. Commissioner,7 7 the Board of
Tax Appeals barred a deduction under this provision for a loss sustained
on the sale of a Gainsborough painting that the taxpayer inherited from
her father, J. Pierpont Morgan. The taxpayer had kept it in her home,
occasionally lending it out. The Board disallowed the claimed capital loss
because the property had been devoted to personal use rather than to a
transaction for profit. On the other hand, a profit motive was found in
Reynolds v. Commissioner,78 where the taxpayer inherited a necklace and
sold it at a loss. 7 9 The Tax Court and the First Circuit permitted a capital
loss deduction because the taxpayer engaged in no conduct that contradicted his realizing the necklace's maximum value: immediately upon
inheriting it, he placed the necklace with a reputable jeweler for sale. 0
Somewhere between these cases and closer to the Wrightsman situation
lay the facts of Tyler v. Commissioner." I The taxpayer there collected stamps
for investment and as a hedge against currency inflation. From 1926 to
1940 he bought $448,000 worth of stamps, all on the recommendation of
a professional philatelist. He maintained careful records of his stamps.
The philatelist testified that Mr. Tyler did not evince an interest in stamps
as a hobbyist or collector. Mr. Tyler never gave specific instructions to
seek or purchase stamps nor did he engage in activities common to stamp
collectors. Collecting did give him pleasure and he kept his albums at
home. When he wished to increase his liquidity in 1938 through 1941,
Mr. Tyler sold portions of the collection. He incurred a loss of $210,000.
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's primary intent was investment
and allowed a capital loss deduction. His personal motives were found to
be secondary.
The Service subsequently issued a brief ruling 2 stating that if a taxpayer collects stamps as a hobby, the sale of his stamps at a loss would be
nondeductible under section 165. Although hardly a disputable result, the
ruling did not illuminate the difficult cases involving multiple motives.
The Wrightsman trial commissioner in the Court of Claims applied these
authorities and found that the taxpayers' primary motive was investment,
76 Id. at 1323.
77 25 B.T.A. 1317 (1932).
18 155 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1946), aff'g 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 837 (1945).
79 The court rejected ordinary loss treatment because the taxpayer was not in a trade or
business related to necklace sales, Id. at 840-41.
s See also Marks v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 173 (1945), acq. 1946-1 C.B. 3.
8! 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 275 (1947).
82 Rev. Rul. 54-268, 1954-2 C.B. 88.
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not hobby. The full Court of Claims reversed this finding. It rejected the
per se legal standard proposed by the government, that to qualify under
section 212 the taxpayer had to show either segregation of the art so as to
preclude personal pleasure or at least a course of conduct inconsistent
with pleasure. Instead, on the basis of the same balancing test of motives
that the trial commissioner had used, the Court of Claims found the
taxpayers' investment motive not primary. It relied on the Wrightsman's
extensive personal use of many items in the collection in their Palm Beach
home and New York apartment: walls were hung with 18th century
oriental wallpaper, floors were inlaid with 18th century parquet flooring,
and bedrooms were furnished with Louis XVth furniture.
On the facts before it, the Court of Claims probably reached the correct
result. Stated in the negative, the section 212 regulations for pre-1970
years and the section 183 regulations for post-1969 years mandate nondeductibility if the transactions are carried on "primarily" as a sport,
hobby, or recreation."3
The court had to determine the primacy of one subjective motive over
another, but by reference to objective facts and circumstances, The extensive personal satisfaction and use the Wrightsmans derived from their
.collection necessarily weighed heavily in the court's determination. It
properly rejected the standard urged by the Service, that investment
motivation can be shown only where the taxpayer is shut off from the
pleasure of the collection; nevertheless, the Wrightsmans' failure to deal
at a distance with their collection obviously swayed the court. The court
did not foreclose the possibility of a deduction for collectors under section
212, but if the collector lives with and enjoys his collection he can hardly
expect to present a better case than did the Wrightsmans. All of the other
traditional criteria for deductibility-careful record-keeping, business-like
dealings, professional training, and high probability of ultimate profit
through appreciation-appeared in the case, but without decisive impact.
Presumably, when the taxpayer does separate himself physically from his
collection-as when it is maintained at the premises of a dealer or on loan
to a museum for an extended period-deductibility will be seriously
entertained under the Wrightsman holding. How much-if anything-is
left of the Tyler notion, that access to the collection without much enjoyment also may give rise to deductions, remains unclear.8 4
Another argument bears on the result, one that apparently was not
made or considered in the Court of Claims. Suppose the Wrightsmans
intended never to sell their collection but only to pass the property to a
charity upon their death. In that event, though they would expect their
collection to appreciate, they would not seek "income" from it in the
traditional income tax sense of "gross income." For section 61 purposes,
83

Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c) and § 1.183-2(a) (1972), T.D. 7198, 1972-2 C.B. 177.

84 Wrightsman reflects the view of the Court of Claims. The tax court or a district court

might conceivably apply the § 212 standard in a fashion more favorable to the taxpayer.
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appreciation alone is not income;8 5 were the Wrightsmans to die holding
the property, the appreciation never would be realized and would not
enter their gross income. Arguably, property that appreciates is not held
for the "production of income" under section 212 unless the taxpayer has
a more than negligible expectation of future realization of gain and gross
income inclusion.86
In any given case, of course, the government might find it difficult to
negate all intention by the taxpayer to realize gain in the future. Some of
the same elements that bore on the hobby loss determination in
Wrightsman, such as personal use of the artworks as part of the collector's
intimate surroundings, would bear on this point too. Evidence that the
collector expected to leave the collection to a museum would also be
relevant. If the likelihood of realization were found to be negligible,
section 212 might bar deduction of expenses on this ground alone.
B.

The Artist
1. The Trade or Business Requirement: Deduction of Expenses in
General

The artist who claims deductions for expenses related to his work may
also be called upon to show that recreation-seeking motives were subordinate to profit-seeking motives. The inquiry differs from that for collectors
in that the artist may come within section 162, which provides for the
deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in pursuit of a
trade or business. In the relatively small number of cases that have
considered the question, the artist devoted substantially full time to his art
work, but did not enjoy net income from the activity in the tax year.
Instead, the artist sought to deduct expenses related to his art against
either investment income or income of a spouse. The artist optimistically
professed the expectation that his work soon would be discovered and
that he would profit from appreciation in its value. He contended that his
activities constituted a trade or business, not a hobby, so that the net loss
was deductible.
Occasionally, *the great disparity between the income derived from the
artworks and the expenses incurred over a substantial period of time has
led the court to conclude that there was no reasonable expectation of
profit. In Estate of Hailman v. Commissioner,87 the taxpayer had been active
81 Eisner v. Macomber,

252 U.S. 189 (1920).

86 Some support for this view may be found in case law and the § 212 regulations. In

Hunter v. United States, 219 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1955), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit construed the word income in § 212(1) to require the creation of
"increased gross income." Id. at 72. The § 212 regulations provide that "income" for
purposes of the section includes gain from the "disposition of property." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.212-1(b). The corresponding regulation under § 183, however, construing activity engaged
in for profit, is ambiguous. It first states that "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value
of assets used in the activity but then explains that an overall profit may result when
appreciation is "realized." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(4).
87 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 812 (1958). The case arose under § 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, the
predecessor to § 162 of the 1954 Code.
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in both horticulture and the arts and maintained a studio on her grounds.
In the period from 1920 to 1953, she sold 50 paintings, including portrait
commissions, out of about 600 that she executed. From 1950 to 1954 she
had no arts receipts but claimed over $40,000 in expenses due to salaries
for domestic help, club dues, auto expenses, utilities, and expenses related
to her studio. The Tax Court concluded that she did not have a profitseeking motive and was not engaged in a trade or business; it therefore
denied the deductions. Similarly, in Porter v. Commissioner,8 8 the taxpayer
worked as an artist, studied and painted, and even had a one-man show in
1948. From 1950 to 1966 he sold $600 worth of paintings; for the three
years in issue, 1964 to 1966, he deducted $861, $1,142, and $3,080,
respectively, for paint, canvas, frames, studio, and other expenses. The
court had little difficulty finding that he was not engaged in a trade or
business. But sincerity without financial success has triumphed on at least
one occasion. In Adams v. Commisioner,89 the taxpayer, who never sold any
of his works, was allowed to deduct studio expenses. The court was
impressed by his family's relative penury, indicating that he was no hobbyist but seriously engaged in his art.
Artists who have gained professional recognition, particularly from
their peers, have succeeded in establishing that their art is a trade or
business. Rood v. United States9" concerned a sculptor of international
reputation who had been a professor at the University of Minnesota and,
for two years, president of National Artist's Equity. By the date of the trial
he had completed 500 works of sculpture and he had sold approximately
25 percent of them. The partnership into which he entered with his
second wife for the creation and sale of his sculpture made money in
1948, 1949, and from 1957 to 1959, but lost money in the years 1950 to
1956. The District Court found that the taxpayer entered into his
sculpture with the expectation of profit, that the partnership was engaged
in a trade or business, and that the losses for the years in issue were
deductible.
The Tax Court confronted a closer case in de Grazia v. Commissioner.9 1
Anna Maria de Grazia had studied under famous artists in Italy and
achieved some recognition as an artist there. She had several exhibitions
and was a member of the Professional Artist's Union. She testified that for
the year 1957, the year in issue, she attempted to build up her inventory
of paintings rather than concentrate on sales. From 1957 to 1960 she had
receipts of $1,800 but claimed expenses of $23,000. Her receipts from art
increased in each of these three years and she kept careful records of her
work. Stressing her professional connections, the Tax Court held that she
was engaged in a trade or business.
A more recent case in this general area is Churchman v. Commissioner,92
88 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1489 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1970).
89 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239 (1966).
90 184 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1960).
91

21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1572 (1962).

92 68 T.C. 696 (1977).
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decided under section 183 and its regulations, which spell out the factors
to be taken into account in determining whether an activity is entered into
for profit. Gloria Churchman, an artist, worked in a number of media but
was primarily a painter. She taught courses at San Francisco State College,
exhibited her painting and sculpture at galleries, and had several onewoman shows. She had been involved in artistic activities for twenty years
but in none of those years did income from the sale of artworks exceed
her art-related expenses. For the years in issue, 1970 to 1972, she had
$250 of income in 1972 but none in the other two years. The taxpayer
made posters and books in order to make her work more available to the
public, and she also kept careful records.
Applying the criteria set out in Treasury Regulation section 1.183-2, the
Tax Court found a number of factors that militated against a finding of a
trade or business-a history of losses, a lack of dependence on the income
from the artistic activities, and the presence of a significant recreational
element. These were overborne, however, by still others that supported
her claim-she carried on the activities in a businesslike fashion, had
trained to become an artist, and had devoted substantial time to her
artistic activities. The Tax Court emphasized the artist's involvement in
nonrecreational aspects of her work, especially marketing. It considered
the failure to realize current income less important in visual arts than
other fields, because beginning artists first must attain a degree of public
acclaim before their serious work will command a price sufficient to
provide a profit. A long gestation period before profitability is to be
expected and should not of itself undercut a finding that the activity was
entered into with the expectation of ultimate profit.
It is instructive to compare the application of the factors enumerated in
the section 183 regulations to the Wrightsmans-collectors-and to
Churchman-an artist. Both cases involve some factors favorable to the
government and some factors favorable to the taxpayer. The disparate
results cannot be explained by the number of factors on each side. Instead, the rather different contexts in which the cases arose mandated a
different weighting of the applicable factors. Wrightsman turned on a
comparison of personal gratification with the expectation of ultimate profit
as the motive for investing in the artworks. In Churchman, we take as a
given the creation of the artworks and its attendant recreational elements,
looking instead to see whether the activities were carried out together with
other activities normally pursued by professional artists.
Churchman and the prior cases suggest that full-time artists are likely to
find the courts more receptive to their claims for deduction than are
collectors. Professionalism in the form of peer recognition, attention to
business detail, and training weigh heavily. Lack of current income can be
excused-at least in some situations-on the grounds that income has
been subordinated to the need to build inventory or establish a reputation.
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Comparison of Wrightsman and Churchman in Regard to Factors Now Listed in Treasury
Regulation Section 1.183-2(b)
Wrightsman
Churchman
1. Manner in which the taxpayer
carries on the activity
T
T
2. Expertise of the taxpayer or his
advisors
T
T
3. Time and effort expended by the
taxpayer in carrying on the
activity
T
T
4. Expectation that assets used in
activity may appreciate in
T*
T
value
5. Success of the taxpayer in carrying
on other similar or dissimilar
activities
6. Taxpayer's history of income or
losses with respect to the
activity
7. Amount of occasional profits, if any,
which are earned
8. Financial status of taxpayer
9.
T

Elements of personal pleasure
or recreation
Factor was favorable to Taxpayer;

G

G

G*

G

G

G

G*

G

G

G
G
Factor was favorable to Government

* The Tax Court did not expressly state whether taxpayer met this standard, but the
thrust of the opinion indicates the result listed.

2.

Studio Expenses

A finding that the artist is engaged in a trade or business is a necessary

but not sufficient condition for deductibility of many artists' expenses.
Typically, a working artist will seek to deduct expenses related to his
studio. If the studio is maintained independently of the artist's residence,
this should present no added problem. But where the artist lives and
works in the same space-a common arrangement-deduction of studio

expenses must also leap the new hurdle erected by section 280A. This
section was added by the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1 9 7 6 93 to curb the
deduction of expenses arising from vacation homes and home offices.
Section 280A imposes additional conditions on deductibility that an

artist may find difficult to meet. For example, the artist must use the
studio either "exclusively" as his principle place of business or as a place
of business used by his customers in meeting or dealing with him in the
ordinary course of his trade or business. 9 4 If the studio space doubles as
9' Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601(a), 90 Stat. 1569 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of
I.R.C.). Proposed regulations for § 280A have recently been issued. See Proposed Regs. §§
1.280A-l-1.280A-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (1980).
" I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
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living space, these criteria cannot be met. Moreover, the expenses allocable to the studio can be deducted only to the extent of gross income from
the sale of artworks less deductions not dependent on trade or business or
profit motive. 5 This limitation may severely reduce the studio-related
deductions of an artist who has few sales in a particular year.
3.

Travel Expenses and Education Expenses

On the other hand, artists who pass the trade or business test may be in
a better position to qualify for deduction of education and travel expenses. Like any other taxpayer, an artist may deduct education expenses
to maintain or improve skills but not to qualify the artist for a new trade
or business. 96 The amateur artist's expenses for art classes should therefore be nondeductible; they constitute an "inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures. 9 7 To someone who has crossed the trade
or business threshold, however, the same classes properly will be treated
as a deductible expense.
Although travel and entertainment questions have been litigated extensively, few cases have had occasion to articulate what travel expenses
might be deducted by a professional artist. 98 Some illumination can be
obtained from cases concerning travel for education by school teachers.
The courts have struggled to determine whether a particular trip is
related primarily to the teacher's business, the test of deductibility. 99
When the trip was only remotely related to the occupation, the courts
have denied a deduction. Thus, a European trip taken by a driver education instructor did not become deductible because he observed world
traffic problems and made inquiries about vehicle codes and license requirements in other countries. 100 This information, if learned, would not
have aided materially in his teaching of driving in California.'
Similarly,
where the trip in fact did little to enhance the teacher's skills, the cost of
travel was nondeductible. An art teacher who traveled to the Carribean,
the Soviet Union, and Hawaii-but visited only one art museum-did not
render his vacation deductible by bringing back inexpensive native handcrafts to show his classes.1

2

The Tax Court however, has allowed travel deductions to teachers
where the travel more integrally related to the teacher-taxpayer's subject
9 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).
9 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a) and (b)(3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36.
97Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36.
9sIn de Grazia, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1576, the Tax Court allowed a deduction for part of
the artist's travel expenses to Italy.
" See Treas. Reg.§§ 1.162(a)-(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36.
100Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 833 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
'"' See also Cochran v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 466 (1973); Baker v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 962 (1973).
1"2 Schrimpf v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275 (1977). See also Allison v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114 (1977).
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matter. In Marlin v. Commissioner,'0 3 both husband and wife taught
school-he Latin and she history. As they toured France, they visited
abbeys, cathedrals, chateaux, museums, and other historical sites. The
court found that she maintained and improved her skills as a history
teacher, but that visits to ancient Roman ruins was not sufficiently connected with his skills as a teacher of Latin to render his expenses deductible.'

0 4

By a parity of reasoning, the practicing artist may require travel to
repositories of art. Artists traditionally have learned much from study of
the old masters. A trip to Paris to visit the Louvre, to Florence to view
Renaissance painting, or to New York to observe avant garde styles, if the
primary purpose of the travel is study, should be deductible under section
162.
IIl.

EXCHANGES

The Code requires a taxpayer to recognize any gain realized on an
exchange.10 5 Section 1031, however, permits nonrecognition of gain on
certain exchanges of like-kind property. The Code treats such exchanges
as inappropriate occasions for taxation. Both the property received and
that given must be held either for "productive use in trade or business" or
for investment. Property held primarily for sale and intangible personal
property such as stock or securities do not qualify. Both collectors and
artists may seek to swap one work of art for another and to come within
section 1031, thereby avoiding present taxation on the disposition of their
works while obtaining new artworks for investment purposes or their own
enjoyment.
A.

The Collector

When a collector exchanges an appreciated work of art for another, he
may try to characterize the exchange as of like kind to fall within the
ambit of section 1031. As noted, the section applies only to property held
for investment or for productive use in trade or business. For most collectors, the only possibility for qualification lies in holding for investment,
since their activities involving artwork do not amount to a trade or business. Under Wrightsman,10 6 however, the collector who derives significant
personal enjoyment from the 'art he owns rarely will be able to show that
his investment motives outweigh his personal motives, and like kind
treatment may be denied. Although no authority equates the standards
for "investment" under sections 1031 and 212, there is no good reason to
develop a rule more favorable to taxpayers for section 1031 exchange
103 54 T.C. 560, acq. 1970-2 C.B. xx.
104

See also Gibbons v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 366 (1978); Weiman v. Commis-

sioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 372 (1971); Smith v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1281 (1967);

Oehlke v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1967).
105 I.R.C. § 1001(c).
'0'See text accompanying notes 75-76 & 83-86 supra.
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purposes, and it is unlikely the Service would do so. 10 7 Most collectors,
therefore, cannot find a safe habor in section 1031 and a swap of artworks
will be a taxable event to them.
Even if the collector can demonstrate the requisite investment motive,
he must make the further showing that the works exchanged were of "like
kind."' 0 The regulations provide that "like kind" refers to the nature or
character of the property, rather than to its grade or quality.' 0 9 The
application of this regulation to unique, original artworks is unclear without an understanding of the kinds of differences that are of quality, as
opposed to character. Is an exchange of works in two different media,
such as a swap of a painting for a sculpture, of different character while a
swap of one painting for another a question of quality? Are ten decorative oversized paintings and a small old master of "like kind"? Or should
all fine artworks be treated as of like kind, just as the regulations treat all
real estate as of like kind whether improved or unimproved no matter
0
what the location?"
A recent ruling suggests that the Service is unlikely to construe "like
kind" broadly in new areas. In Revenue Ruling 79-143,11 the taxpayer
exchanged coins held for investment for other coins. The old coins were
numismatic-type, the value of which depends on date, condition, scarcity,
and the like. The taxpayer received bullion-type coins, the value of which
is determined by the quantity of precious metal they contain. The ruling held that the exchange was not of like kind. Curiously, it drew
support from section 1031(e), added in 1969-a provision that treats a
swap of livestock of different sexes as not constituting an exchange of
property of like kind. The ruling and its citation of section 1031(e)
suggest a narrow view of "like kind" property in new areas, including
artworks: just as section 103 1(e) corrects a "city-feller" confusion in equating a cow with a bull, perhaps a Renoir peasant girl and a Warhol soup
can will not be considered "like kind." The critical element in appropriately defining this narrow view appears to be whether the exchange leaves
2
the owner in a different economic position.''
Thus, either because the collector lacks an investment motive or because the exchange is not of "like-kind," most swaps by collectors fall
outside section 1031 and should be reported as taxable. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that collectors frequently exchange artworks
and fail to report gain on these exchanges, perhaps because they are
unaware that the swap is a taxable event or because they realize that the
107 Cf. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9thCir. 1979) (equating § 165 standard of
investment with that of § 1031).
1.R.C. § 1031(a).
'o9 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 C.B. 272.
...Id. See Crichton v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 490, aff'd, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941);
Braley v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1153 (1929), acq. VIII-2 C.B. 6 (1930).
"1 1979-1 C.B. 264.
112 Cf Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 326 (2d Cir, 1962) (construing the
related standard under § 1033 of what is "similar or related in service or use").
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Service has no effective way to discover the gain." 3 The appreciation on
the first work may thus escape tax permanently. To illustrate, suppose a
collector purchases a painting for $10,000 and swaps it for a second work
in a later year when both works are worth $50,000. Subsequently, the
collector sells the second work for $70,000. He reports gain of $20,000
using as his basis $50,000, the fair market value of the property when he
acquired it. 1 14 If gain had been recognized on the earlier swap this would
be an appropriate result. Use of the $50,000 basis under the circumstances postulated, however, effectively excludes from tax the $40,000
appreciation the collector enjoyed on the first work.
The Service may be unaware of the untaxed gain on the first work and
therefore raise no questions as to the proper treatment of a sale of the
second. If it becomes aware of the earlier exchange, the Service will be
unable to tax the gain on the swap directly if the limitations period has
expired for the earlier transaction."' The Service nevertheless might seek
relief at the time of the later sale under the mitigation provisions, sections
1311-1314. These provisions allow for adjustments in later years to correct errors in earlier years when the error is described in section 1312.
Use of the $50,000 basis by the collector appears to fall under section
1312(7)(C)(i): a determination that affects the basis of property and involves erroneous nonrecognition treatment of a prior transaction on
which basis depends. An example in the regulations seems to confirm this
application of the statute." 6 The Service accordingly could assess a tax on
the $40,000 gain at the later date under section 1314.
B.

The Artist

The artist also may find it difficult to qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition of gain on exchanges of art; but if he succeeds, he may enjoy
not only deferral of tax on gain, but also permanent loss of its ordinary
income character under section 1221(3). Like the collector, the artist faces
the question of what constitutes "like kind" property. He too must show in
addition that he holds the work for investment. In the case of the artist,
however, the initial problem is to avoid the exclusion from like-kind
treatment for property held "primarily for sale.""' 7 As discussed earlier,
an artist may hold some of his properties for sale and some for investment
so that at least some of his works might qualify in theory for section 1031
exchange treatment." 8 Although the ordinary asset rule of section
1"' The Service's problem of discovering the gain is not limited to exchanges-it applies as
well to sales of artworks and other collectibles.
114 1.R.C. § 1012.
"' Section 6501(a) provides a general limitation period of three years after a return has
been filed for the assessment and collection of tax. Omission from gross income of more
than 25% of the amount stated in the return extends the period to 6 years, § 6501(e)(l)(A).
'6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-7(c), example (l)(ii) (1956).
117 1.R.C. § 1031(a).
'" See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra; Estate of Chandor v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.
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1221(3) obviates the need in most cases to decide when an artist holds for
investment, direct authority to guide the artist or the courts in close cases
is almost nonexistent. 11 9 To complete the section 1031 conditions, the
artist must receive on the exchange artworks that he will hold for investment; if he sells the new work too soon after acquiring it, he arguably
received it for sale and not for investment.
If the artist qualifies, an exchange of one of his works for a work by
someone else under section 1031 not only defers recognition but probably
succeeds in divesting him of the ordinary income increment in the old
artwork. The new work can qualify as a capital asset because it falls
outside section 1221(3)-the artist did not create the new work with his
own personal efforts, nor is his adjusted basis in the new work determined
by reference to the basis of the artist who did create it; his basis under
section 1031(d) is determined by reference to his basis in the property
exchanged. No relevant part of section 1221(3) applies and the new work
thus can have capital asset status in his hands. Indeed, as an extra bonus,
the artist's holding period in the new work includes that of the old, 2 0° so
that capital gain on the sale of the work may qualify as long-term sooner
than one year after the exchange.
The Service might argue that section 1031 in any event should not
apply because the untaxed element in the new work does not represent
capital appreciation, as normally would be the case, but rather personal
services. 121 The Service would argue that the personal services element
should not qualify under section 1031, even though it is embodied in
"property" and is so treated for other purposes. In Fleming v. Commissioner, decided together with Lake v. Commissioner, 122 the Supreme Court
held that an exchange involving a carved out oil payment fell outside
section 1031, notwithstanding that the payment constituted an interest in
real property under state law. The oil payment was a substitute for
ordinary income, and the exchange triggered current taxation. This analogy to assignment of income is apt in some respects; the section 1221(3)
treatment of an artwork resembles the tax treatment of an assignment of
income in that, on a gift of the work by the artist and subsequent sale at a
gain by the donee, the gain retains its ordinary character.1 2 3 But it differs
721 (1957), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 4. Similarly, real estate dealers and subdividers may hold some
land separately for investment. See Turner v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1976).
I) Section 1031 speaks of property held primarily for sale. Section 1221(1) adds "to
customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business." The extra words are restrictive.
See Burnett v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 605 (1939), nonacq. 1940-1 C.B. 6, aff'd in part and

rev'd in part, 118 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1941). Prior to 1950, it was generally accepted that gain
from the sale of works enjoyed by a professional artist was ordinary because his works came
under the predecessor of section 1221(1). See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra. It is not
clear, however, whether the possibility that the artist might hold some of his works for
investment ever was presented squarely.
120
121

1.R.C. § 1223(1).
The Tax Court so held in another context. Tobey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 227

(1973), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
122
123

356 U.S. 260 (1958).
I.R.C. § 1221(3)(c).
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in that the gain is taxed to the donee, not the artist. 12 4 Furthermore, the
Service, prior to the 1969 TRA, allowed artists to deduct the fair market
value of their works contributed to charity, treating the entirety as prop1 25
erty, not as income interest.
As with much tax alchemy, the benefits of an artist's like kind exchange
may be too good to approve. Qualification under section 1031 undercuts
the purpose of section 1221(3): to close the capital gain "loophole" for the
artist's personal services income. If a court wished to prevent the conversion of such income into capital gain, it could find against the artist on any
of the threshold points discussed above without reaching the assignment
of income question. Moreover, if there are multiple swaps or immediate
sales, it might find section 1031 inapplicable, either because the old work
has become property held primarily for sale or because the new work has
become such property rather than investment property.' 26 Again, the
policy problem is to segregate the services income component of value in
the artist's work and tax it as ordinary income while treating investment
appreciation as eligible for other statutory benefits-in this case, deferral
of gain on a like-kind exchange. I discuss a proposal that makes this
distinction in Part V.
IV.

GIFrS

TO CHARITY

When the creator or collector of artworks donates them to a charity, he
closes out his investment experience. The donor ordinarily receives no
money or property in return, but enjoys an income tax deduction that
provides him some financial benefits. 2 This section examines the special
problems that arise with charitible gifts of artworks, paying particular
attention to the question of valuation.
A.

The Collector
The measure of the deduction for a charitable contribution in kind is
2 8
the fair market value of the property donated.1
Unrealized appreciation-gain on which no tax has been paid-therefore gives rise to an
ordinary deduction in many cases. This violates the usual rule that limits
deductions to previously taxed income. 29 Beyond providing an additional
124 Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (income from donated property taxed to
donor; short-term gifts of income ineffective to change taxpayer).
125 The 1969 TRA altered the charitable deduction rules for ordinary income property.
See text accompanying notes 154-56 infra. Under the old rules, however, the Service did
contest the artist's valuation on occasion. Compare Rebay v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH)
181 (1963) (value reduced) with Kuderna v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 749 (1965)
(claimed value upheld).
126 See Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332; Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333; Rev. Rul.
77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304; Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1979-2 C.B. 305.
127 See I.R.C. § 170.
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A(c)(l), T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 81.
129 It is instructive to compare the tax treatment of appreciated property in other circumstances that give rise to deductions. If a thief steals a painting that has appreciated in value,
the collector's deductible loss is limited to adjusted basis, and the precise value of the
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subsidy to induce donors who enjoy substantial appreciation in the value
of their artworks to make contributions, this rule appears to have little to
commend it. 130 Like the charitable contribution deduction itself, the benefits for deduction of untaxed appreciation rise with the donor's income
bracket and run primarily to the wealthy. One practical difficulty of the
rule is that it creates the need to put a numerical value on the artwork, a
value that has little or no significance except for tax purposes.
Despite important statutory modifications of the charitable deduction in
1969,131 valuation remains a central issue for charitable gifts in kind.
Under the best of circumstances, works of art are difficult to value. All
original artworks are unique; unless the work was bought and sold in the
market in an arm's length exchange within a reasonable time of the
donation, its dollar value must be estimated by reference to the sale prices
of comparable works, and to numerous other potentially relevant data.
The range of expert opinion regarding the value of a particular work may
be wide. Data concerning the sale of comparable items is itself often
difficult or impossible to obtain. Furthermore, valuation may depend not
only on extrapolation of the prices paid for other works by the same artist
or of the same period, but also on the medium, size, and genre of the
work, its condition, and perhaps most important of all, its authenticity.
Moreover, the conception of fair market value as a particular dollar
amount, although necessary to compute the donor's deduction, is itself
artificial. Fair market value can be expressed more correctly as a range of
dollar amounts, any one of which represents a reasonable price for the
work. For example, two experts may value a donated work at $12,000 and
$15,000 respectively, but each might well agree that the other's estimate
lies within the range of reasonableness. Yet calculation of the donor's
income tax liability requires the selection of a particular point in the
range.
painting is irrelevant so long as it exceeds adjusted basis. I.R.C. § 165(b); Treas. Reg. §§
1.165-8(b), T.D. 6786, 1965-1 C.B. 117 and 1.165-7(b)(1), T.D. 7522, 1978-1 C.B. 59. If a
collector transfers the painting to a business employee in payment for accrued salary due,
the collector deducts the fair market value of the work (if a cash payment in the same
amount would have been deductible) but recognizes gain on the difference between adjusted
basis and fair market value. See Rev. Rul. 69-181, 1969-1 C.B. 196. Either the appreciation
drops out in computing the deduction, or it is recognized and taxed as gain. Inclusion of the
gain in income does not always offset the effect of the deduction. This lack of offset might
occur, for example, if the gain is long-term capital gain.
Artworks can decline in price as well. The text does not deal with this variation.
"' See Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv. 309, 371-72
(1972); McDaniel, Federal Matching Grantsfor CharitableContributions:A Substitutefor the Income
Tax Deduction, 27 TAx L. REV. 377, 407-09 (1972). But see Bittker, CharitableContributions:Tax
Deductions or Matching Grants, 28 TAx L. REV. 37, 63 (1972).
"' For a gift of appreciated property, § 170(e)(l) now reduces the charitable contribution
deduction by the portion of the appreciation that would have given rise to ordinary income
on a sale of the property at fair market value and also by part of the remaining unrealized
appreciation under specified circumstances. A gift of appreciated property which has been
held for over a year to a public charity for use in connection with its exempt purpose, such
as a donation of a painting to a museum, generally incurs no reduction. Section 170(f)
regulates split interest gifts, a fact pattern neglected prior to 1969.
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Valuation for tax deduction purposes hardly constitutes the best of
circumstances for ascertaining "true" value. The taxpayer, the appraiser
he selects, and the charitable recipient have every incentive to fix the
value as high as possible. The taxpayer's benefit is obvious-once he has
determined to give away a work of art, the difference between $12,000
and $15,000 is $3,000 in extra deduction. The charity benefits in a
secondary fashion: the more attractive the donor finds the act of giving,
the more likely he is to repeat it. The charity has every reason to be
grateful and to hope for further gifts, and has no reason to question
value. The appraiser in good conscience can support the highest reasonable value. The only loser is the absent party, the Treasury-and by
extension, other taxpayers, who will have to make up the shortfall. We
should be surprised if donors failed to give, themselves the benefit of any
doubt-and occasionally more. One commentator has found overvalu32
ation by donor-collectors to be widespread.1
A recent case suggests the possibilities for abuse. 133 A corporation
bought a collection of paintings for $12,000 and sold an undivided fractional interest to the taxpayer for $1,200. The corporation supplied an
appraisal for the collection of $250,000 and arranged for a charity to
receive the artworks as a donation. The collection included paintings
attributed to David, Murillo, Crespi, Master, and Zurbaran. Two experts
at trial, one of whom was the Los Angeles County Art Museum Director,
pronounced them all fakes. When an IRS auditor visited the charity to
inspect the paintings, he was told that two had been lost and one stolen.
Taxpayer's expert witness, the corporate vendor's appraiser, exhibited
little familiarity with the artists or the period. The Tax Court had little
difficulty deciding to cut the taxpayer's deduction to what he .paid,
$1,200.134
The opening gun in the valuation battle belongs to the taxpayer. He
places the first value on the work when he claims the deduction on his
return. The auditing agent is unlikely to be able to value artworks himself,
and the engineering and valuation minions at the call of most district
directors generally have little training in such work. In 1968, to curb
valuation abuses, the Commissioner established the Art Advisory Panel
(AAP) at the suggestion of the Association of Art Museum Directors.13 '
The AAP reviews taxpayer valuations of artwork contributed to charity or
transferred by death or gift. In the charitable gift situation, the taxpayer
generally desires a high value and the Commissioner a low one; for
transfer tax purposes their positions are reversed. In theory, impartiality
132 Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasersof Art, 80 COLUM, L. REv. 214, 238-40
(1980).
"' Vander Hook v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1394 (1977).
134 Query whether even this amount was justified.
135 I.R.S. News Release, [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6573. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue recently filed a notice of determination of necessity for establishment of
an Art Print Panel. [1980] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6587.
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is preserved by the fact that the panel does not know which kind of issue
is before it. 136 At its most recently reported meeting, in November 1977,
the AAP considered 55 charitable contribution cases, involving 243 appraisals. It concluded review of 131 of these, accepting 92 and adjusting
39. It recommended a reduction from $13.2 million to $10.2 million of
13 7
the aggregate value claimed.
The Commissioner apparently has adopted the AAP value in at least
some instances when challenging taxpayer valuations, though an expert
may be found supporting an even lower value. This tactic may induce a
favorable judicial response-a court faced by two sets of experts may seek
a reasonable compromise between the two alleged values and adopt the
13
AAP valuation as a justifiable stopping point. In Posner v. Commissioner, 1
for example, the taxpayer donated a painting by the Italian artist, Zanchi,
called The Death of Seneca. The taxpayer argued that Zanchis were rare in
this country and had an expert testify that the painting was worth
$15,000. This appraisal was marred by the fact that the appraiser had
initially mistaken the painting for another subject, The Good Samaritan.
The Commissioner's expert testified that Zanchi painted in an anachronistic style, using Baroque style long after it had lost its popularity. Moreover, the composition of the painting was "unpleasant" and the positioning of the figures awkward. This expert concluded that the painting was
of greater value to scholars than to collectors and was worth only $1,500.
Two years after the contribution, another Zanchi was sold at auction in
Milan for $2,592. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's AAP
value of $5,000.
One case has challenged the dual role of an expert in serving on the
AAP and then testifying at trial on the Commissioner's behalf. Furstenberg
v. United States1 3 9 involved the value of a Corot figure painting, La Meditation, in 1967 and 1968. The painting brought $51,800 at auction in 1963.
The purchaser then "restored" the painting, the restoration including
excessive overpainting which distorted the underlying figure. But the reduction in the value of La Meditation caused by excessive overpainting was
more than offset by the advance in the art market generally and the
market for Corot figure paintings specifically. Two months before the first
charitable contribution, a Corot called Girl in Red with Mandolin was sold at
auction for $310,000. The experts testifying at trial put the value of La
Meditation at $40,000, $90,000 and $250,000 respectively. The AAP had
valued La Meditation at $85,000. The trial judge rejected or discounted the
testimony most favorable to the taxpayer as coming from a long-time
friend and business associate. He likewise rejected or discounted the
"I In practice, knowledgeable participants in the art market may know who owns particu-

lar works and therefore deduce which way the valuation benefits may run.
1 1977 Annual Summary Report of Closed Meeting Activity of the Art Advisory Panel
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, [1979] 9 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 5975.
138 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 943 (1976).
139 595 F.2d 603 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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testimony of one government expert, Eugene Thaw, that the painting was
worth $40,000-on the grounds that he had served on the AAP and
therefore might be biased. The trial judge took the remaining expert
value, $90,000, and adjusted it upward to give more weight to the sale of
Girl in Red with Mandolin. He found a value of $160,000.
The Court of Claims thought the attribution of bias to Mr. Thaw
improper. It found no reason to believe that an expert witness will cease
to remain independent because of his service on the AAP. In this particular instance, Mr. Thaw's valuation of the painting, $40,000, was far below
that of the AAP. There was no evidence that he felt constrained to
support the AAP value. After giving substantial weight to his view, the
Court of Claims cut the value to $125,000. As the Court of Claims
recognized, a contrary finding regarding Mr. Thaw might well have
discouraged experts from serving on the AAP. An imputation of personal
bias might reduce volunteers for the AAP or the availability of expertise
at trial.
Once the question of value enters the courtroom, the judge may be
presented with difficult factual questions, inevitably obscured further by
differences among experts. Among the most difficult is that of authenticity. Many artworks carry a cloud as to their origin. A work alleged to be
that of an old master instead may be an outright forgery, a work from a
student of the artist, or a work by an unrelated artist of the same period.
Although the source would seem not to affect the aesthetic appreciation
of the work, it does greatly affect price.
A number of cases have dealt with questions concerning authenticity of
contributed works. In two instances in the Tax Court, Judge Tannenwald
sidestepped deciding whether the work originated from the claimed
source. Instead, he properly valued the work with the cloud created by
reasonable doubts as to source, discounting heavily for serious uncertainties as to authenticity. 140 Absence of provenance contributed to the discount.

14

140 Cf. Holtzmen v. Commissioner, [19801 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H)
80,174 (similarly as
to authenticity of ancient coins).
141 In one case, Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994 (1968), there was doubt as to the
authenticity of a painting, a purported Gilbert Stuart, and also as to the identity of the
subject. Declining to resolve these doubts, judge Tannenwald took these "blemishes" into
account as depressants on value. He emphasized the absence of provenance as bearing on
these depressants.
in Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 76-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9118 (2d Cir. 1975), the taxpayers donated a painting entitled Susanna, allegedly by
Tintoretto, to Hofstra College (now Hofstra University). The painting was unsigned, but
Tintoretto rarely signed his work. A fully authenticated painting by the artist, Susanna and
the Elders, depicts the same nude female with other people, animals, and a different background. The experts at trial differed regarding the authenticity of the work; the taxpayers
claimed a value of $150,000 and the Commissioner asserted a value of $2,000. The taxpayers
offered no proof as to how and when they bought the painting or how much they paid for it.
There was no provenance of the work or any mention of it in art literature or catalogs.

Judge Tannenwald emphasized that settlement is more appropriate in connection with

"inherently imprecise" valuation questions than submission to the court and again declined
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A related and equally difficult fact question concerns restoration. Old
works often need to be restored as paint flakes off or other wearing takes
place. The quality of a restoration affects the work's value. In the two Tax
Court cases referred to above, the paintings were examined
under a
42
"black light" to ascertain the amount of overpainting.'
Aside from subsidiary factual problems that relate to the condition or
authenticity of the work, the important concept of fair market value itself
as applied to artworks contains an ambiguity: the proper market for the
art. The price for a work will vary depending on whether the purchaser
buys it directly from the artist, through a gallery, or at auction; and often
there may be geographic differences in markets as well. The regulations
state the classic formulation of fair market value-the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. 4 3 Also, they direct that if the
property contributed is of the same type the taxpayer regularly sells in the
course of his business, then value shall be determined by reference to the
price usually received in his customary market.1 44 Furthermore, if a
donor makes a charitable contribution of property at a time when he
could not reasonably have expected to realize its normal selling price, the
value of the gift is the actual amount he could have obtained. 145 These
general rules, although useful in some situations, may afford little guidance in valuing charitable donations by collectors. Suppose, for example, a
collector buys a work directly from an artist for $500. Later when a
similar work of the same artist is offered for sale by a gallery for $1,200,
the collector gives his work to a museum. Does the gallery offering price
reflect the best estimate of value, or may the government discount that
price by the substantial commission, perhaps half the selling price, that
the gallery will earn on the sale?
Sometimes the taxpayer gives the charity less than his complete interest
in the work in the form of an undivided fractional interest. 46 This form
of gift may provide a convenient way around the percentage limitation on
contributions provided by the Code. 147 Donors, the Service, and the
to make any determination as to authenticity. Id. at 674. Instead, he took account of the
conflict as a serious depressant on value. On the basis of the entire record, Judge Tannenwald found a value of $10,000.
42 Furstenberg, 595 F.2d 603, involved a substantial reduction in value for bad restoration. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
14' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2), T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 81. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6
(1964) (valuation for estate tax purposes).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2), T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 81.
145 Id. § 1.170A-1(c)(3).
14 The gift must satisfy the current possession requirement of § 170(a)(3) in order to
qualify for the deduction. This condition is met if the charity has possession for a period
proportionate to its undivided fractional interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-5(a)(2) (1972). For
gifts made after 1969, the requirements of § 170(f)(3)(B)(ii) must also be met in order to
obtain the deduction.
147 I.R.C. § 170(b)(I)(A), (B), and 170(d) fix maximum charitable contribution deduction
limits of 20, 30, or 50% of the individual's contribution base-generally, his adjusted gross
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courts all seem to presume for valuation purposes that the deductible
amount is the proportionate share of the whole work: 148 an undivided
one-quarter interest in a sculpture worth $50,000, for example, is valued
at $12,500. Yet for other tax purposes, including the analogous case of
intrafamily transfers, a discount from the proportionate value for a
minority interest is understood to be appropriate. Thus, for estate tax
purposes, the Service routinely reduces the taxable value of minority
interests.149 The Service properly should seek a similar discount here.
A related problem concerns restrictions placed by the donor on the use
of the property by the charity. Donors occasionally limit the charity's
freedom to deal with the gift. They may provide that the charity cannot
sell a painting or even that it must be displayed in a particular way. The
charity receives less than the full Value of the work: an unrestricted work
plainly is worth more than a restricted one to the recipient. Yet there is no
evidence that the reduction in value to the charity attributable to the
restrictions is taken into account in valuing the gift for deduction purposes."50 The argument for reduction of the deductible amount is clear:
the charity gets less than full ownership so the donor should deduct only
the value of the benefit he has conferred.
Such restrictions on the charity's use do not mean the donor has
retained an interest in the work. If he had, the entire deduction may be
denied under section 170(f)(3). The regulations qualify a gift with a
condition limiting the charity's freedom to deal with it only if the donation
conveys the donor's entire interest. The regulation test is whether the
possibility that the charity will lose the-work by reason of the condition is
so remote as to be negligible.' 5' But it does not follow that simply because
this test can be passed the charity has received the full value of the work;
an adjustment in the amount of the deduction to reflect any reduction in
value should be required.
More generally, the collector's ordinary deduction based on untaxed
appreciation rests on no sound theoretical foundation. Its justification lies
in a series of untested assumptions about empirical matters: the asserted
inducement to collectors to alter their behavior and make donations to
museums and the belief that institutions would not otherwise obtain the
income-depending upon the nature of the charity and the type of property donated. The
excess can be carried forward in some cases. I.R.C. § 170(d).
148 See, e.g., Furstenberg, 595 F.2d 603.
14 Tishman v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Va. 1959); Chertkoff v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979); Campanari v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 488 (1945). For a discussion of the analogous problem for stock in a closely held corporation, see Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
934 (1974). See also Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives On Sophisticated Estate
Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 170-77 (1977). But see McColgan v. Commissioner,
10 B.T.A. 958 (1928).
IS' In Gordon v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1227 (1976), the parties stipulated that
certain unnamed restrictions reduced the value of the work by 13%. See also Silverman v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1066, 1075 (1968).
...Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(3) (1972); § 1.170A-l(e), T.D. 7340, 1975-1 C.B. 116.
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amount and quality of works they presently do. But the tax cost to the
Treasury may be far greater than previously believed when all of the
imperfections in the valuation process that the collector can exploit are
taken into account. And the benefits to institutions may be diluted when
undue donor influence on the operation of the institution is considered.1 52 Even if the unrealized appreciation rule were altered, as I propose in Part V, a range of other federal tax incentives-notably retention
of the ordinary deduction for gifts out of previously-taxed income and
the estate tax charitable contribution deductionl 3-and nontax incentives-including personal benevolence-would assure art institutions a
continued flow of gifts. Any shortfall could be adjusted at less cost to the
Treasury through direct grants.
B.

The Artist

Prior to the 1969 TRA, the statute treated the artist in the same fashion
as the collector and allowed a deduction for the full fair market value of
15 4
works donated to charity. In some instances, valuation was contested.
The TRA added section 170(e)(1)(A), 5 5 a provision that reduces the
amount of the charitable deduction dollar for dollar by any gain that
would have been ordinary had the donor sold the property instead. An
artist's sale of his own works gives rise to ordinary gain. 15 6 The new
provision thus reduces the artist's deduction to adjusted basis, frequently
zero or a nominal amount.
The present rules painfully contrast the charitable deduction treatment
of artists and collectors. The theoretically proper rule-disallowance of
deductions for untaxed appreciation-applies in full vigor to artists but
not at all to collectors. This result flows from the distinction between
ordinary income appreciation and capital gain appreciation drawn by
section 170(e)(1)(A): the collector's untaxed gain is property income, the
artist's is services income.
If the artist could avoid the ordinary asset treatment of section 1221(3),
the reduction in section 170(e)(1)(A) no longer would apply. Two possibilities for accomplishing this were suggested earlier. When the artist
sells a work to his spouse or other related person in an arm's length sale,
17
the spouse takes the work free of the section 1221(3) characterization.
152 The impact of donor influence on the tax expenditure portion of the gift is analyzed
in a study prepared for the Twentieth Century Fund by Feld, O'Hare, & Schuster, tentatively titled "Public Money and Private Choice; The Case of Indirect Aid to the Arts" (forthcoming).
153 I.R.C. § 2055.
's4 See, e.g., Rebay v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 181 (1963) (value reduced from
$169,000 to $9,300). In some cases, the courts sustained the artist's value. See, e.g., Cambridge
Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1411 (1968); Kuderna v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 749 (1965).
"I Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 170).
5 I.R.C. § 1221(3). See text accompanying notes 23-33 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 35-46 supra.
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If the spouse holds the work for more than a year, gain on a sale would be
treated as long-term capital gain. If the spouse instead donated the work
to charity, section 170(e)(1)(A) would not apply and the deduction would
equal fair market value. This result obtains even when artist and spouse
file a joint return. The result is justified for the same reason that capital
gain treatment to the spouse upon sale is justified. The artist pays ordinary
income tax on his services income when he sells the work to his spouse.
The excess over this amount plausibly can be treated as an increment
accruing to capital gains. One function of section 170(e)(1)(A) is to obviate
the possibility that a charitable contribution would net the taxpayer more
in tax savings than a sale would net him in after-tax proceeds. Section
170(e)(1)(A) meets these objectives as applied to the spouses' contribution.
Another approach to the artist's avoidance of section 1221(3) lies in the
section 1031 like-kind exchange provisions. 58 If the artist can meet the
statutory tests, the work he receives on the exchange would obtain capital
asset treatment under section 1221(3) and a subsequent donation of the
work to a charity might thus escape section 170(e)(1)(A). But as we have
noted,159 this approach should not succeed because it defeats the purposes of section 1221(3) in that the increment representing the artist's
services will never be taxed at ordinary income rates.
If the artist or his family can avoid ordinary income characterization, he
assumes the same tax posture as a collector and the problems of valuation,
condition, and restrictions discussed in reference to collectors will arise. In
the usual case, however, section 170(e)(1)(A) precludes any tax advantage
for artists through charitable gifts of appreciation in artworks and these
problems are largely absent.
V.

PROPOSALS

As we have seen, the different treatment accorded the art collector and
the artist under the federal income tax derives largely from the different
sources of their investment in the work. Consistently with the generally
accepted distinction between personal services income and gains on the
sale of property, it seems appropriate to tax the artist at ordinary rates on
his personal services income and to afford the collector the more favorable capital gain benefit on the return of his after-tax investment. The
general appropriateness of this treatment breaks down in two areas--the
failure to acknowledge the artist's position as an investor and the overly
generous treatment of gifts by collectors to charity.
A. An Artist's Election
The artist has no assured way of converting his before-tax services
investment in a work into a capital, after-tax investment by electing to pay
the tax. We have noted two possible ways to achieve this result, the
See text accompanying notes 117-26 supra.
"9 See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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interspousal sale and the like-kind exchange. As we have seen, the results
under neither approach are assured under current law. Moreover, one of
the two approaches mentioned-the like-kind exchange-appears to defeat rather than accord with the statutory scheme. Finally, both approaches are theoretically unsatisfactory in that they make the artist's tax
status turn on a fortuity-a spouse or other family member with an
independent estate or another artist in whose works the taxpayer wishes
to invest. A statutory device to permit the artist to pay taxes on his
personal services and commence a position as an investor in his own work
would be far preferable.
I propose a statutory election to permit the Artist to include the fair
market value of the work, less basis, in income in the year the work is
completed as if he had sold it." n' The value so included would become the
artist's basis for purposes of taxing future gain or loss. Once the artist
makes the election, the work would fall out of section 1221(3). The artist's
holding period for capital gain and loss purposes would begin with the
16
election. This approach is not foreign to our tax laws.
The income tax benefits of the election to the artist would extend to
several areas. First, a sale after a year would produce capital gain rather
than ordinary income. After a year, the artist could give the work to
charity without reduction of the deductible amount under section
170(e)(1)(A). In addition, the artist could meet the threshold holding-forinvestment requirement of section 1031 and could diversify his portfolio
of artistic works without paying additional tax. Since the artist will have
paid his tax under the election, the purposes of the statutory scheme
would be met. Finally, the artist's election could extend to cover charac6
terization under the source rules for foreign income.1 1
From the Treasury's perspective two objections should be considered.
On a practical level, an artist would have a strong incentive to value the
work too low and thereby convert some services income into capital gain.
The Treasury would have traditional audit remedies available to it and
could adjust values. But as we saw in connection with works held by
collectors, valuation is likely to be more difficult here than in other tax
areas. Unlike a collector who gives the work away, however, the artist
retains the work and any later sale or donation by the artist gives rise to a
sale price or fair market value for a deduction that would be of some
evidentiary value in judging the earlier value claimed. Moreover, for the
successful artist, there would be sales of comparable works in most years
"" See Feld, O'Hare, & Schuster, supra note 152, at ch. X. As noted below, the statute
could limit the election to a percentage of the artist's other income realized from his
artworks if an unlimited election is thought to be too broad.
161 I.R.C. § 83(b) currently allows for a similar election in the year of property transfer
when a person performs services and receives property subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture in exchange.
62 In the view of one District Court, a change in the character of post-election income to
capital gain apparently would not of itself alter the source rule result. AMP, Inc. v. United
States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9606 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
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that would narrow the range of appropriate values. These remedies could
be supplemented by express provision for adjustment of the value placed
on the work by the artist at the time of the later sale or other disposition
of the work. Such a look-back might contain a safe-haven rule that would
give the artist the benefit of an assumption that the work increases in

63
value at a fixed rate of compound interest from the date of the election.1

For example, it might be assumed that the value of the painting increases
at an eight percent compound rate of interest from the date of the
election and that on a subsequent sale or contribution of the property a
value that reflects such an increase would be accepted for income tax
purposes.
If further deterrence against undervaluation is needed, the election
might require as a condition that the artist offer the work for sale at the
price he elects. If the artist sets the price too low in order to avoid income
taxes, he runs the risk of losing the painting at a bargain price.
A second objection to the election is more theoretical. Assuming that
the election properly separates services income from gain on property,
why should the latter necessarily be treated as capital gain? As we noted at
the outset, gain on appreciation of a work of art in the hands of the artist
may be thought to constitute an inventory-type gain rather than an
investment-type gain. 64 But once the services component is included in
income, the need to classify the gain under section 1221(1) diminishes. By
reason of the holding period, long-term capital gain treatment will apply
only to a sale more than a year after the election; this makes an investment motive rather than a sale motive more plausible. Moreover, although the income tax pretty firmly prevents the conversion of services
income into capital gain,1 65 there are exceptions that expressly grant
6
capital gain treatment to gain on property held primarily for sale.1'
These considerations, however, are not conclusive. At bottom, a decision
to characterize as investment return the artist's gain that exceeds the value
of his creative services reflects a judgment that an artist's business generally consists of creating works for immediate sale. Retention of a work
reflects an investment in it rather than entry into a related but new
business of trading in the works. 16 7 The income tax has allowed capital
treatment in the analogous cases of others who deal in investment assets,
68
such as real estate dealers and brokers who deal in stock and securities.
To guard against taxpayers treating gains as capital and losses as ordi163 Section 1023(h)(3)(B)(ii), now repealed, see note 29 supra, would have operated in
a similar fashion. The § 482 regulations also provide similar safe-haven rules.
164 See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
1'65See, e.g., Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
166 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1231(b)(2), (3), 1237.
167 The artist may view retention as a failure to sell rather than as an investment. But the
"failure" usually reflects an unwillingness to sell below a particular price. Like any investor,
the artist pits his sense of the "right" price against the current market.
"8 I.R.C. § 1236.
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nary, classification of the property from the outset as a capital asset, or
denying that -classification, is essential. The proposed election implicitly
provides for such classification. Note that the characterization as an investment rather than as inventory need not be taken on an all or nothing
basis covering all of the artist's works. The artist's election could be limited
to some percentage of his total arts income or in some other respect.
B.

Charitable Gifts of Appreciated Property

A second proposed change concerns the treatment of collectors. 16 9' The
rule permitting a fair market value deduction for charitable contributions
of appreciated property results in permanent loss of tax on the accrued
gain. The argument in support of the rule rests on the additional incentive it creates for donors to make contributions. This incentive varies with
the marginal tax bracket of the donor and with the amount of appreciation, so that the most successful and wealthiest investors get the largest tax
benefits from the rule. Furthermore, contrary to the general discussion in
the literature, we have seen that the tax benefit may not be limited to the
tax foregone on the appreciation; by reason of defects in the valuation
process,"' an unintended part of the incentive in fact may consist of
deductions claimed for nonexistent appreciation through inflated valuations.
A more appropriate result, one that is more consistent with the treatment of untaxed gain elsewhere in the Code, would reduce the amount of
the contribution for deduction purposes in a manner similar to the mechanism now provided by section 170(e)(1)(B). The contribution would be
treated, in effect, as a sale coupled with a contribution of the proceeds of
the sale: the donor includes in income the amount of the gain, deducts
sixty percent of the gain under section 1202 for the sale of a capital asset,
and deducts the fair market value of the property. Instead of doing so in
three steps, however, the donor simply deducts fair market value less
forty percent of the gain-the net result of the above three steps.
This solution would mitigate but not eliminate the problem of donor
overvaluation of contributed artworks. If excess valuation is as systematic,
widespread, and difficult to control as Professor Speiller has suggested,"'1
a more stringent limitation on the charitable contribution of property in
kind is called for. A limitation of the amount of the deduction to the
collector's investment, i.e., basis, allowing no benefit for appreciation,
would obviate the valuation question. To be sure, a collector who holds a
work that has in fact appreciated significantly then would do better by
selling the work, recognizing the gain, claiming the capital gains deduction, and contributing the proceeds of sale to the charity, than he would
' If the artist's election is adopted, the artist will be treated
purposes of the proposed change in treatment of charitable gifts.
'7,

like a "collector" for

See lext accompanying notes 131-51 supra.
See Speiller, supra note 132, at 238-40. Anthoine tends to minimize the enforcement

difficulties produced by this problem. See Anthoine, supra note 17, at 275-79.
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by donating the work. Requiring the collector to take this additional step
is far from outlandish. The market would give a more accurate reading of
the work's value than the collector and his appraiser together are likely to
provide. In addition, the charity may be better off if it receives cash to buy
works of its own selection as opposed to accepting gifts of art selected by a
collector that may carry with them an implied undertaking by the
museum to hold and display rather than sell immediately in the market.
Critics of proposals to limit the charitable deduction for contributions in
kind do not defend the present treatment as theoretically correct. Instead,
they point to incentives that they claim the deduction creates for individual collectors to enrich public art institutions. Any alteration of the rules,
they say, will impoverish these institutions by depriving them of private
gifts. The weakness of this defen'se is both empirical and theoretical. No
reliable data supports their assertions: none exists as to the annual
amount of appreciation that enters the charitable contribution deduction
for gifts in kind, let alone what the effects of a reduction or elimination of
these tax benefits on the amount of charitable gifts to the arts would be.
Doubtless, feelings of personal benevolence, social pressures, estate tax
concerns, and a variety of other non-income tax incentives would continue
to call forth some gifts to museums, and the reduction in the level of
contributions might well be small.' 7 2
We should also pause to reflect whether we aid museums better by
encouraging gifts of appreciated property or gifts of cash. Gifts of property might well divert from the choices that otherwise would be made in
the professional judgment of curators and other museum staff.'7 3 The tax
benefits provided by the government-indirectly paid for by every
taxpayer-may in fact subsidize only an accumulation of second rate
objets d'art to be stored in museum basements. Under the proposed
change in the law, a donor who desires to place a particular object with a
museum may of course continue to do so, but without the present high
cost to the government. Finally, if a reasonable estimate of loss to art
institutions by reason of the proposed change in the charitable deduction
rules can be made, the government simply can compensate the institutions
for the loss through direct grants.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has traced the different income tax consequences to collectors and creators of art through a number of their common transactions
such as the sale of works at a gain, exchanges, and gifts to charity. We
'72 For 1973, data from the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
National Study of Philanthropy (1974), analyzed by Feld, O'Hare, & Schuster, supra note
152, at Table 1.3, shows that gifts in kind constituted about 10% of all charitable gifts. For
gifts to culture, however, they amounted to about 57% of the total of $325 million. What
proportion of the gifts in kind represented gain is not known, nor does the data distinguish
art objects from other appreciated property, such as corporate stock.
'73 See Feld, O'Hare, & Schuster, supra note 152, at ch. 6.
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have also examined the deductibility of certain expenses incurred by these
taxpayers. I have concluded that the different tax treatment afforded
collectors and artists is generally appropriate, owing to the different
sources of the taxpayer's income. The artist's income is equivalent to
everyday wages-the fruit of personal services-and is taxed accordingly.
The collector realizes gain on the investment of after-tax income and is
taxed consistently with that status.
I have discussed two areas where the Code could be improved. An artist
should be allowed to assume the position of an investor in his own
works-and obtain the tax treatment that accrues to that classificationonce he has completed the work. This would be consistent with other
Code provisions. Furthermore, gifts by collectors to charity currently
receive unduly favorable treatment. The current rules are difficult to
administer and are amenable to taxpayer abuse. The commonly accepted
goal of support for museums could be met without the problems discussed. I have suggested changes in the statute to conform these problem
areas with the rest of the statutory scheme while preserving their stated
objectives. Tax provisions can never attain the sensitivity and elegance of
art itself, but those who work with them can aspire to greater internal
consistency, clarity, and equity.
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